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To

TELL OR NOT To TELL:

LATENT ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFECTS AND THE DOCTRINE
OF CAVEAT EMPTOR IN REAL
PROPERTY SALES
by Liso J. Hamm Winnenouer

G

Corp. is a case arising from an
2
aborted
realMills,
estate transaction.
Its
Inc. v. Russell
reenwood
primary significance lies in the court's application of the caveat emptor doctrine (doctrine) to the purchase of commercial property possessing latent environmental defects.3
The use of the doctrine in this case is
important for several reasons. First, it controverts a growing trend abandoning the
doctrine in favor of an emphasis on good
faith and ethical dealing.4 Second, by finding
that information conceming the existence of
environmental defects was reasonably available to the buyer in this case, the court may
be requiring buyers to do much more than
physically inspect a property prior to making

an offer in order to avoid a finding that they
failed to meet their duty to investigate as it
relates to latent environmental defects. Finally, this court's holding may impact the
usefulness and value of option contracts for
the purchase of commercial property.

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
In September 1988, Greenwood Mills
(Greenwood) decided to sell its Liner textile
plant located in Orangeburg County, South
Carolina.s At that time, the property had a
history of environmental problems,6 including wastewater treatment violations which
had led to a consent order with the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC).7

Russell Corporation (Russell) contacted
Greenwood in August 1989 concerning its
potential interest in acquiring the property
and arranged a site visit.8 Prior to its first site
visit, Russell's Director of Environmental
Affairs contacted the DHEC to inquire about
the plant and was informed that while there
had been violations in the past, Greenwood's
wastewater treatment facilities now met
DHEC standards.9 Russell representatives
then made two site visits to the plant in early
September.10
After the first site visit on September 6,
1989, Greenwood informed Russell that
Sara Lee, Russell's major competitor, was
seriously interested in the property.n Greenwood representatives made a second site
visit on September 11, and on September
12 wired Greenwood $600,000 to hold the
property. 12 In a letter dated September 18,
Greenwood acknowledged receipt of the
deposit, describing it within the letter as
"non-refundable."1 3 The letter also included
information on nine items Russell might wish
to investigate and a general invitation to
"'kick the tires' yourselves."1 4 Greenwood
also enclosed with the letter a draft purchase
agreement, which Russell did not sign.' 5
Russell then hired a consultant to perform
a full environmental audit of the property.16
While the environmental audit proceeded,
Russell's Director of Environmental Affairs
had an opportunity to view some of
Greenwood's environmental records during
a third site visit on October 23, 1989.17 In
addition, the DHEC granted Russell access
to its Greenwood files after receiving a Free-

1 981 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1992).
2

Id. at 148.

3 Id. at 150-51. Few cases have been decided to date involving a seller's duty to disclose environmental defects; the trend indicates "a seller has certain common law disclosure
obligations, as well as federal and state statutory disclosure duties." Robin E. Phelan, Bryan D. Perkins & Catherine W. Cralle, Dancingthe Toxic Two-Step: Environmental
Problems in Bankruptcy Cases, Cot. L &PRAC. COURSE HANDaoOK SmUES, PRACHQNG L Nsr., ADvANCE B~ream. WoRKSHoP n.1 (Feb. 13-14, 1992), availableinWestlaw, 601
PI/Comm 445 at 158.
4 See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Ariz. CL App. 1986) (11e "vitality (of the doctrine of caveat emptor] has waned during the latter half of the 20th century.);
Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141. 143 (Ga. CL App. 1976) ("The ancient rule ... is no longer an expression of American mores."); Tobin v. Paparone Constr. Co., 349 A.2d
574. 578 (N.J. Super. CL Law Div. 1975) ("Our courts have come a long way since the days when the judicial emphasis was on formal rules and ancient precedents rather than
on modem concepts of justice and fair dealing."); Holcombe v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 512 (N.D. 1985) ("The duty to speak imposes no undue hardship on the seller and it
accords with our basic notions of fair dealing and fair play.'); Beavers v.Lamplighters Realty, Inc., 556 P.2d. 1328, 1331 (Okla. CL App. 1976) (Caveat emptor is "a doctrine
that exalts deceit, condemns fair dealing, and scoms the credulous."). See alsoW.PAGE KEETON, Er AL.,PRossER &KEEro oNNTHE
AW oF ToRTs§ 108, at751-52 (5th ed. 1984).
5 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149.
6 Id. at 149. Greenwood was aware of environmental problems as early as 1979, when the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control discovered
that Greenwood had improperly sprayed sludge in a pine forest. Appellant's Brief at 7-8; Greenwood, 981 F.2d 148 (on file with author) (hereinafter Appellant's Brief).
7 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149. See also Appellant's Brief at 7-13.
8 Greenwood,981 F.2d at 149.
9 Id.
10 Id. Conflicting testimony was presented by the parties concemingwhether Greenwood affirmatively misrepresented the severity of its environmental problems during these
site visits. Appellant's Brief at 16.

11 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149. Charles Nichols, Greenwood's sales agent, advised Gerald McGill, Russell's Group Vice President of Textile Operations, that he expected
an offer from Sara Lee, and that a ten percent deposit would be adequate to hold the property. Appellant's Brief at 15.
12 Id. at 149. See also, Appellant's Brief at 15.
13 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149. For purposes of its appeal, Russell did not contest the issue of non-refundability, but did note in its brief that Nichols assured them that
the moneycould be returned ifany problems cameup. Appellant's Brief at 15, n.3. Greenwood's letterdescribing the depositwas drafted by its outside counsel, who had participated
in an environmental review of the plant earlier in 1989 and, therefore, was knowledgeable about the extent of Greenwood's environmental problems. Appellant's Brief at 1718.
14 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149. The letter acknowledged the existence of PCB's, a landfill and the consent order from DHEC, but did not mention the much more serious
problem of groundwater contamination, a construction debris landfill, a soil dump contaminated with diesel fuel, and plant's inclusion on the Environmental Protection Agency's
listing of Superfund cleanup sites. Appellant's Brief at 18.
15 Greenwood,981 F.2d at 149.
16 Id. Russell also informed Greenwood "that it would want the plant by February 1, 1990." Id.
17

Id.
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dom of Information Act request from
Russell.' 8 From the DHEC files, Russell
learned for the first time that groundwater on
the property was contaminated.' 9
On November 2, 1989, Russell faxed to
Greenwood a copy of the documents it had
uncovered and indicated it would probably
want its deposit back.20 Greenwood's sales
agent requested Russell wait until it received
the final results from its environmental audit
prior to reaching a decision concerning purchase of the property.2'
The environmental report was received
on December 14, 1989.2 The report indicated that substantial contamination existed,
the cleanup cost of which could not be
accurately predicted? By letter dated December 19, 1989, Russell informed Greenwood that the deal was off.24
Greenwood brought a diversity suit against
Russell in South Carolina federal district

court to obtain a declaratory judgment confirming its right to retain the $600,000
deposit paid by Russell? Russell asserted
counterclaims of fraud, misrepresentation
and rescission of contract based on mutual
mistake.? After trial, the jury found for
Greenwood.? AfterthecourtdeniedRussell's
motions for JNOV or a new trial,2 Russell

appealed.29
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision, holding that under South
Carolina law "[a] seller does have a duty to
disclose 'an artificially created, and concealed, unstable condition,'"30 but only if
"the seller.

.

. know[s] that the material facts

are beyond 'the reach of the diligent attention, observation and judgment of the purchaser."' 3 '

HI.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
Caveat emptor or "Diet the buyer beware...

summarizes the rule that a purchaser must
examine, judge, and test for himself."32 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability for physical harm on a seller when the
seller knows or should know of the existence
of a latent, dangerous condition which involves an unreasonable risk of harm; the
seller does not disclose the condition to the
buyer; and the seller has reason to believe the
buyer will not discover the harm? The rule
is applied ". . . when there exists in the

property which is the subject of a sale latent
defects or hidden conditions not discoverable on a reasonable examination of the
property."" In such situations, "the seller, if
he has knowledge thereof, is bound to disclose such latent defects or conditions to the
buyer, and his failure to do so may be made
the basis of a charge of fraud."a Liability will
be imposed, however, only if the buyer has
satisfied his duty to inspect the property.

18 Id. South'Carolina Freedom of Information Act, S.C. CODE Amea. § 304 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
19 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150. See also Appellant's Brief at 18.
20 Id.
21 Id. Interestingly enough, Greenwood did not at this time assert its claim that the deposit was non-refundable. In addition, Greenwood conducted an auction on December

6, 1989 to sell its equipment housed at the plant so that the property would be available for Russell's use by the February 1.date indicated by Russell. Greenwood, 981 F.2d
at 149.

22 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150.
23 .Id. Aquaterra, Russell's consultant, estimated it would take five to eight years to clean up the contamination and approximately $1.2 million. Appellant's Brief at 20.
24 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150.
25 Id. Greenwood also brought a claim to recover $1.5 millign in losses it allegedly sustained by hurriedly selling its equipment at auction so that the plant could be available
by the February 1 dated requested by Russell. Id. In addition, Greenwood's original complaint requested specific performance, but this claim was later dropped. Appellant's
Brief at 39.
26 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150.
27 Id. In addition, the jury awarded Greenwood $1.5 million in damages resulting from Russell's negligent failure to inform Greenwood it was not proceeding with the purchase
prior to Greenwood's auctioning of its equipment. Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. (quoting Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 180 S.E.2d 206, 208 [S.C. 1971D.
31 Id. at 150-51 (quoting Lawson v. Citizens & Souther Nat'I Bank, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 [S.C. 1972D. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the trial court's award of
damages to Greenwood for losses sustained in its plant equipment auction, holding that the trial court's decision on this claim under tort theory directly conflicted with Greenwood's
claim under contract theory. Id. at 151.
In reversing the damages award, the court also relied on Winburn u. Insurance Co. of N. Am., which requires a claimant to provide evidence that the statement relied upon
was false when made, 339 S.E. 2d. 142, 147 (S.C. CL App. 1985); and Gruber v. Santee Frozen Foods, Inc., which requires the claimant to show justifiable reliance in order
to recover. 419 S.E.2d 795, 799 (S.C. CL App. 1992) The Court determined that "Russell's statement that it wanted the plant by February 1 was a mere statement of future
intention, insufficient to support a claim for negligent misrepresentation, absent evidence that the statement was false when made." Greenwood,981 F.2d at 152. The court
went on to note that, since an actual purchase agreement had notbeen signed by the parties, and since Russell had notified Greenwood as early as November 2, 1989 of its concems
regarding environmental problems, Greenwood's reliance under the circumstances was "plainly unjustifiable." Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 151-52.
32 BAcK's LAw Dicnomwv 222 (6th ed. 1990).
33 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF Tors § 353 (1965). § 353 is set forth below:
§ 353. Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Vendor
(1)A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land,
is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after thevendee
has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will not discover
the condition or realize the risk.
(2) Ifthe vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective
precautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.
34 37 Am. Jun. 2D Fraudand Deceit § 158 (1968).

35 Id.
36 RESTATEMENr

(SEcoND) oF Torrs § 353 cmt. d (1965). Comment d provides, in partd. Vendee's duty to inspect. A vendor, innocent of conscious deception, is entitled to expect, and therefore has reason to believe, that his vendee will discover
a condition which would be disclosed by such an inspection as the vendee should make before buying the land and taking possession of it or before throwing it open
to the entry of others. A vendor, therefore, is not required to exercise care to disclose dangerous conditions or to have an ordinarily retentive memory as to their
existence, unless the condition is onewhich such an inspection bythe vendee would not discover or, although the condition would be so discovered, the vendorrealizes
the risk involved therein and has reason to believe that his vendee will not realize it.
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Latent Environmental Defects and the Doctrine of Caveat Erptor
Many courts do not recognize the doctrine, preferring to impose upon the seller
the duty to act in good faith.Y A large
number of states, however, still adhere to its
basic tenets.33 The instant case was decided
under South Carolina law, which provides
that "[a) sellerdoes haveadutyto disclose'an
artificially created, and concealed, unstable
condition,"'39 but only when "the material
facts are beyond "'the reach of the diligent
attention, observation and judgment of the
purchaser.' 40
There is little case law availablespecifically
on the subject of the duty to disclose defects
relating to environmental issues. 41 The few
opinions that can be found suggest the law in
this area is nowhere near settled. 42 Some
states have permitted buyers to seek relief for
latent environmental defects under a variety
of common law theories, "including nondisclosure of latent defects, negligence, strict
liability, breach of warranty or contract, and
breach of indemnity agreements.""
Other states, including Missouri, have enacted statutory provisions requiring sellers to
disclose the presence of contamination or
37

other latent environmental defects on property." Even so, requirements from state to
statevary significantly." In those states where
statutory provisions do exist, generally the
buyer is not permitted to void the sale and, as
a result, ends up owning the contaminated
land."

I. THE INSTANT DECISION
In determining that Greenwood was entitled to retain the $600,000 deposit paid by
Russell, the court emphasized the fact that
"Russell got exactly what it bargained for
here: an option contract."a The court went

on to recognize that "[pilacing the deposit
allowed Russell to conduct a thorough environmental investigation and avoid the losses
it might well have sustained if it had prematurely entered into a purchase agreement."a
The court rejected Russell's argument that
Greenwood had a duty to disclose its environmental problems and that its failure to
disclose rendered the transaction unenforceable 49 The court held that under South
Carolina law "[a] seller does have a duty to
disclose 'an artificially created, and con-

cealed, unstable condition'" but only when
"the material facts are beyond 'the reach of
the diligent attention, observation and judgment of the purchaser.'" 5
The court noted the fact that Russell, like
Greenwood, was a textile manufacturer and
emphasized that "Russell could not have
been surprised to learn that textile production involves substances which can lead to
environmental hazards if not handled properly"' and that Russell knew "such hazards
would not be discernible through mere visual
inspection."a The court went on to suggest

that a review of Greenwood's files and other
public records would have revealed "the full
extent of the problems,"" thereby satisfying
the requirement that such facts were "reasonably available to Russell. ""

IV. CRTICAL ANALYsIs"
The Fourth Circuit based its holding that
Greenwood had no duty to disclose latent
environmental defects to Russell on the fact
that the transaction did not involve a contract
for purchase of real estate, but rather an
option contract in which "Russell got exactly

See supra,note 4.

38 See, e.g., Philadelphia Eec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3rd Or. 1985) ("As to sales of land this nmle has retained much of its original force.") Adler v.
Parkerson, 581 So.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Louisiana courts appear reluctant tovitiate agreements when the complaining party is, either through education orexperlence,
in a position which renders his claim of error particularly difficult to rationalize, accept or condone."); Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs. (Eastern), Inc.. 578 So.2d 363, 364
(Fla. Dist CL App. 1991) ("[Claveat emptor [is) the rule in the sale of commercial property.").
39 Lawson, 180 S.E.2d at 208.
40 Lawson, 193 S.E.2d at 128.
41 See Phelan, note 3, supra.
42 See generally, Phelan, supra,note 3, and Tracy, Infra, note 43.
43 Judith G. Tracy, Beyond Caveat Empton Disclosure to Buyers of ContaminatedLand, 10 STAN. ENVn.L.J. 169 (1991), available in Westlaw, 10 STENVLJ 169
at 30.
44 Id. at n.118, available in Westlaw, 10 STENVLJ 169 at 31. States include Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. Available in Westlaw, 10 STENVLJ 169 at 107-08. Missouri's disclosure requirements
are set forth InMo. Rev. Stat § 260.465( 1986) (See Appendix).
45 See Tracy, note 43, at n.108, supra, available in Westlaw, 10 SIENVU 169.
46 Id. at n.134. New Jersey and Illinois do penrit the buyer to rescind the transaction. Id. at n.133.
47 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150. The court does not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that the $600,000 deposit constituted an option contract rather than a deposit
for purchase of land. It is assumed the court's finding is based on the fact that Greenwood described it as such in its complaint in order to increase the likelihood it would be able
to retain the $600,000. Appellant's Brief at 39.
48 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150.
49 Id. at 150.
50 Id. at 150 (quoting Lawson, 180 S.E.2d at 208).
51 Id. at 150-51 (quoting Lawson, 193 S.E.2d at 128).
52 Id. at 151.
53
54
55

Id.
Id.
Id.

56 The court's holding that Greenwood's tort claim for auction losses issuperseded by its contract claim for retaining Russell's deposit isnot particularly controversial, and,
therefore, isnot discussed inthe text of this note. Some scholars have suggested that, in the strugglebetween tort and contract law, the law of contract islosing; see GRANTr
GuoR,
THE D.AH or CoNmAcr 55-103 (1974); William L Prosser, The Borderlandof Tort and Contract,in Sa.ECE Torcs ON THE LAW OF TORTs 380, 427-428 (1954); Elizabeth
Cumming, Balancingthe Buyer's Right to Recover PrecontractualMisstatementsand the Seller's Ability to Disclaim Express Warranties,76 Mm. L REv. 1189 (1992).

Nonetheless, the result in the instant case isconsistent with justice and equity. Notwithstanding the inherent conflict within its complaint, the court rejected Greenwood's claim
of negligent misrepresentation, and held Greenwood's reliance on Russell's February 1, 1990 target date for moving inwas "plainly unjustifiable." Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 152.
Greenwood knew at least a month before the auction that Russell had serious concerns about environmental problems. Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149. On November 2, 1990,
Greenwood's sales agent requested Russell refrain from maling a final decision until the final results of its environmental audit were received. Greenwood,981 F.2d at 150. The
final report was not received until December 14, 1989, more than a week after the auction. Greenwood,981 F.2d at 150. In addition, some significance should be placed on
the fact that the contract drafted by Greenwood and forwarded to Russell along with a letter confining receipt of Russell's deposit on September 18, 1989, almost three months
prior to the auction, was never signed and returned. Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149.

I
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what it bargained for." 7 An equally strong
argument, however, can be madethat Russell
did not get what it bargained for. It paid

$600,000 to hold what it presumed was a
piece of property it was interested in purchasing.'8 It can be inferred from Russell's
decision not to proceed with the purchase
after it received the environmental report
that it was never interested in buying contaminated property.'
The court also suggests that, through the
option contract, Russell avoided losses it
might otherwise have sustained by prematurely entering into a purchase agreement."'
The court does not address the $600,000
Russell lost by entering into an option contract it presumably never would have entered
into had it known about the latent environmental problems, nor does it mention the
funds spent by Russell on the environmental
audit which revealed the serious nature of
problems at the plant indisputably already
known by Greenwood."
It should be remembered that Greenwood
had revealed to Russell that Sara Lee was
seriously interested in the property, obviously intending to apply pressure on Russell
to move quickly or risk losing the property to
a competitor.62 In fact, Russell made its
deposit in response to a recommendation to
do so by Greenwood's sales agent.63 The
court rightfully noted that South Carolina law
limits a seller's duty to disclose material facts
beyond "the reach of the diligent attention,
observation andjudgmentofthepurchaser,"" 4
but in the midst of pressure from Greenwood

to act quickly, it is unclear what more Russell
could have done prior to making the deposit
to satisfy its obligation to exercise "diligent
attention, observation and judgment."65
The court noted that Russell contacted the
DHEC before it made its first site visit to the
plant on September 6, 1989,66 and DHEC
indicated "that Greenwood had some violations in the past, but that the wastewater
treatment facilities then met DHEC standards and that Greenwood was operating
the plant within the parameters of the consent order."67 While the court does not
reveal the deliberations underlying its conclusions, it may have concluded that Russell's
contacting the DHEC prior to its first site visit
and DHEC's disclosure of Greenwood's past
violations supported an assumption that
Russell considered the risk of environmental
problems before agreeing to the $600,000
deposit. It could also be argued, however,
that Russell reasonably interpreted the
DHEC's disclosure of Greenwood's "violations in the past"' and current compliance
with DHEC standards" to mean that
Greenwood's environmental problems were
operational in nature and did not involve
conditions permanently affecting the land
itself.
The court's finding that Greenwood did
not have any duty to disclose its environmental problems is troubling in light of the general perception that modem law rejects the
caveat emptor doctrine.7o Many jurisdictions, including South Carolina, still adhere,
in varying degrees, to the doctrine's basic

theme- buyerbeware. A buyer, operating
under the false assumption that caveat emptor
no longer applies, might assume incorrectly
that the seller is required to disclose hidden
problems, and may not realize the significant
burden the buyer assumes by failing to investigate carefully and thoroughly prior to making any commitments in the transaction.
The court's finding that information disclosing the existence of environmental defects was within Russell's "diligent attention,
observation and judgment"" underestimates
the efforts required by sellers to uncover such
information.73 Buyers typically have only
limited access to information.74 For example, absent the $600,000 good faith
deposit, it is quite doubtful Russell would
have been allowed the extensive access to
Greenwood's premises and records necessary for conducting a thorough environmental audit. Russell's audit took three months,
and even then its consultant could not predict with any reliable degree of accuracy the
costs to eliminate the environmental defects.7s
In addition, the records Russell received
from DHEC were obtainable only upon initiation of a Freedom of Information Act
request.7' Certainly, such a process takes
timen and involves some expense. Such a
search of the public records also may leave
the buyer empty-handed, if the contaminated property has not yet been reported to
the proper authorities. This court's holding
leaves unclearwhethera public record search
alone fulfills the buyer's inspection obliga-

57 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150.
58

Id. at 149.

59 Even absentthe inference of intent from Russell's later termination of the transaction, common sense tells us that most buyers are not interested in purchasing contaminated
land!
60 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150.
61 Requiring buyers to perform such tasks places them in the unenviable position of having to decide whether to forfeit money already spent, spend more money to investigate
further, or take their chances and proceed with the deal. See Tracy, supro, note 43.
62 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 149.
63 Appellant's Brief at 15.
64 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150-51 (quoting Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Natl Bank, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 (S.C. 1972)).
65 Id. Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150-51 (quoting Lawson, 193 S.E.2d at 128).
66 Id. at 149.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.

70 See cases cited supro, note 4.
71 See cases cited supra, note 38.
72 Greenwood, 981 F.2d at 150 (quoting Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 (S.C. 1972)).
73 Information in publicrecords isoften scattered and requires persistence to obtain. SeeTracy,supro, note 43. Contamination isoften subsurface and not easilydiscoverable,
even with the sophisticated environmental assessment techniques now available. Id. In addition, environmental audits are typically both time consuming and expensive. See,
e.g., Douglass F. Rohrman and Michael . Hoffman, Environmental Audits: Assessing Environmental Liability in Real Estate Transactions, 77 l.. B.J. 690 (1989).
74 See Tracy, supro, note 43.
75 Appellant's Brief at 20.
76 Supro, note 18.
77 Under South Carolina's Freedom of Infornation Act, an agency isnot required to indicate whether it will make records available for fifteen working days. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 30-4-30(c) (Law. Co-op. 1991). Even then, there isno guarantee that records might not be strewn among various government offices and therefore time consuming to collect
See Tracy, supra, note 43.

86

MLR

Latent Environmental Defects and the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
tion, orwhether an expensive, on-site, technical investigation also is required.
Nor does the court address the increased
transaction costs resulting from a buyer having to pay for the acquisition of information
concerning latent environmental defects. In
most instances, the seller already has knowledge and adequate information available
concerning the subject. If not, surely the
seller is in a better position to acquire such
information than the buyer,78 because the
seller typically has unlimited access to the
property and is more likely to have access to
information concerning the property's history.
In light of burgeoning legislative attempts
to address environmental concerns, the inescapable liability a property owner often faces,
and the astronomical costs typically involved
in cleaning up contaminated property,79 the
presence of hazardous substances always
should be a significant factor in a buyer's
decision to purchase real property. This
court distinguishes the instant case by finding
that the transaction did not involve an earnest money deposit, but an option contract.
By its finding, however, the court may be
sending an unintended message concerning
the practicality of option contracts, at least
where manufacturing sites are concemed.
Option contracts are designed to give the
buyer a period of time to consider its decision
to buy. Such a tool is useful in the commercial world because it allows the buyer adequate time to reach an informed decision
free from the fear that its efforts will be
wasted.
If the discovery of undisclosed latent environmental defects during the option period
does not render the contract unenforceable,
however, as this court holds, it certainly
impacts the value of an option. Surely
Russell would not have paid $600,000 for its
option if, in advance, it knew it would not get
its money back when it discovered the serious latent environmental defects Greenwood
knew about
This court refused to impose upon Greenwood a duty to disclose severe latent environmental defects, even though Greenwood
not only knew about the environmental defects at the time it induced Russell to put

78
79
80
81
82
offset

down the deposit, but also created the contamination through improper operations of
its plant at the site.' Other courts easily
might have found Greenwood had a duty to
disclose the defects.8' Practitioners, however, have come to expect a certain stability
in the application of property law. The
recent overlapping of contract, tort and environmental issues with property law has
created a dangerous and perhaps unexpected unpredictability in real estate transactions.
For practitioners, even those specializing
in real estate or environmental law, deciphering the current tangle of common law
and statutory interpretations may prove impossible. Imposing upon sellers a uniform
duty to disclose latent environmental defects
would ease the current state of confusion.
Nonetheless, without unanimous adoption
and consistent interpretation ofuniform state
statutes, achieving uniformity at the state
level is idealistic at best and more likely
impossible.
Practitioners are therefore advised to exercise extra caution to protect their clients
from unwittingly assuming liability for latent
environmental defects when buying real estate. At a minimum, buyers should be
advised to question sellers concerning the
presence of environmental defects. A search
of available public records is also prudent.
Even better protection is afforded by including specific language in the contract for
purchase of real estate or option permitting
the buyer to rescind if environmental defects
are discovered.
CONCLUSION
Neither party was egregiously injured by
the court's allocation of losses between the
equally skilled bargainers involved in this
transaction."2 Of greater concern, however,
is this holding when read in light of the
currentstate of confusion surrounding application of the doctrine of caveat emptor and
the duty to disclose latent environmental
defects in real estate transactions. Until a
uniform legal-duty to disclose latent environmental defects is imposed on sellers, practitioners, as well as buyers, should continue to
beware.

§ 260.465, RSMo - ritle VXI.
Conservation, Resources and
Development
Chapter 260, Environmental Control
Abandoned or Uncontrolled Sites
260.465. Change of use or transfer of
site property - notice to buyer -

ap-

peal - violations, penalty.
1. No person may substantially
change the manner in which an abandonedoruncontrolledhazardouswaste
disposal site on the registry prepared
and maintained by the department
pursuantto § 260.440 is used without
the written approval of the director.
2. No person may sell, convey or
transfer title to an abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste disposal
site which is on the registry prepared
and maintained by the department
pursuant to § 260.440 without disclosing to the buyer early in the negotiation process that the site is on the
registry, specifying applicable use restrictions and providing all registry
information for the site. The seller
shall also notify the buyer that he may
be assuming liability for any remedial
action at the site; provided, however,
the sale, conveyance or transfer of
property shall not absolve any person
responsible for site contamination, including the seller, of liability for any
remedial action at the site. The seller
shallnotifythedepartmentofthetransfer of ownership within thirty days
after the transfer.
3.Decisionsofthedirectorconcerning the use of an abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste site may be
appealed to the commission in the
manner provided in § 260.460.
4. If the department has reason to
believe that the provisions of this section have beenviolated, orarein imminent danger of being violated, it may
institute a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction for injunctive
relief to prevent such violation and for
the assessment of a civil penalty not to
exceed one thousand dollars per day
for each day of violation.

See Tracy, supra,note 43.
Long-term clean-up costs may reach $500 billion. See Tracy, supra, note 43.
See Appellant's Brief at 7-17.
See cases cited supra,note 4.
It isnoted that both parties shared some loss; Russell lost its $600,000 deposit, plus whatever it spent on its environmental audit, and Greenwood gained $600,000 to
its alleged $1.5 million loss from the auction.
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